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Abstract
In their study, Brenna and Spandonaro analyzed the mobility into Italian regions. In particular, it analyzes the 
situation of 5 regions, with very different backgrounds.  With this paper, we try to better define the meaning of 
health mobility and to find its underlying causes. Furthermore, we propose a strategy that could help in controlling 
mobility flows that currently are the source of health inequalities.
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The article by Brenna and Spandonaro1 describes the Italian situation regarding mobility. Italy has a national health system, with a strong regional autonomy, which 
allows citizens residing in a region to move to another to 
seek medical care. The study analyzes the 2 main reasons for 
the mobility: mobility due to proximity to the geographical 
border or mobility to centers of excellence.
Analysis of the mobility hospital in the Italian Regions has 
several methodological aspects2:
1.	 What is the meaning of “mobility”? It usually refers to 
an administrative concept, related to the financing of 
medical care access: admission to hospital in mobility 
occurs when a patient seek access to medical care in a 
region different from the one of residence, ie, the one of 
registration to the regional health system.
2.	 However, there are different definitions of mobility. 
Among these, perhaps, the best one is the one which 
defines it as moving away from the hospitals frequented 
by the majority of the population close to the place of 
residence; or, simply, mobility is an hospital admission at 
a certain distance from the place of residence.
3.	 These conceptual differences are important in relation to 
the fact that the Italian regions are very different in size 
and shape: mobility intended as the exit from the regional 
borders is obviously higher in smaller regions and in the 
ones with high ratio between perimeter and area.
4.	 In a region like Lombardy, hospitalization of a resident of 
Bormio (a little village located in the north mountain of 
the Region) in a hospital in Mantova (city in the south of 
the Region) is not to considered inter-regional mobility 
but it can represent a substantial mobility (a distance of 
241 km).
5.	 Thus, it is important to distinguish between mobility that 
occurs near the regional borders where an hospital, albeit 
in a different region, sometimes is closer to a patient and 
medium to long range mobility.3
6.	 It should be also considered the fact that the place 
of residence does not always reflect well the place of 
the person’s life. Many people reside in a region are 
domiciled somewhere else. In Lombardy, for example, 
one hundred thousand not residents have chosen a 
Lombard general practitioner medical. These ones will 
definitely choose to be admitted to a Lombard hospital 
and the apparent mobility does not reflect a true mobility, 
but only an administration and accounting mobility. This 
phenomenon is amplified by the fact that some people 
prefer to be hospitalized where progeny, parents or other 
relatives live.
7.	 Then, there are admissions due to sudden illness of people 
who are away from their homes either for work, tourism 
or other reasons. This rate of mobility is not very high but 
it could be relevant in particular contexts characterized 
by substantial outbound and inbound movements. 
8.	 It also must be considered that mobility can be classified 
into nominal or substantial mobility; the latter is due to 
the lack of medical care offering in the area of residence 
or where is little trust in the hospitals close by. 
9.	 Mobility is not the same for all types of admissions, but it 
differentiates greatly depending on the type or complexity 
of admission. We observe, for example, mobility from 
north to south for childbirth, because women, who have 
moved to the north, prefer giving, birth close to their 
native home and to their family of origin. On the other 
hand, there is definitely a mobility from south to north 
for admissions related to severe diseases, eg, such as 
cancer, due to the greater confidence in the structures of 
the north.
10.	 Then some regions dictate a mechanism of quotas that 
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limits the number of admissions to private facilities 
for people who live in that regions while such access 
it is unlimited for nonresidents. 
All these elements make the analysis of mobility flows in 
Italy very complex and thus possible measures to contain 
and control it are difficult to be implemented. Among these 
measures, border agreements to share the limits imposed on 
private structures from neighboring regions are becoming 
more common.
The phenomenon of patient mobility has highlighted, also, 
a very unfair situation among the regions. In some regions, 
patients receive all the quality care they expect while in others 
they do not. Moreover, in regions with lower quality facilities, 
some patients might take alternative routers/approaches/
channels and others have to accept what is offered to them. 
The health migration causes enormous inconvenience both 
for the patient and for families.
From the economic point of view, the admittance in mobility 
is more expensive for the health regional system in the region 
of origin. From this prospective, delivery of healthcare in 
mobility economically favors the receiving (creditor) region 
that is providing the medical service but is not advantageous 
to the region where the patient resides (debtor). Indeed, even 
in the case of bilateral agreements between the outgoing and 
receiving regions, such agreements are limited in scope and 
do not cover entire population that is seeking medical care in 
mobility. 
For private structures encouraging inbound mobility, often 
supported by various forms of promotion, can be a way to 
achieve a satisfactory employment level of their productive 
potential.
Mobility flows are affected also by the fact that patients can 
choose between public and private care structures. Moreover, 
the lack of precise data regarding this preference by the public 
makes the analysis of mobility glows more complicated. 
While the number of accesses to private care is recorded, we 
currently do not know what led to that preference in the first 
place, if it was a indeed deliberate or it was the consequence 
of long waiting lists for access to the national health system. 
There is a strong relationship between how to restrict the 
mobility and patient freedom in choosing where to get 
medical care. Even by warranting these freedom of care 
choice for patients, a right guaranteed by the Italian system, 
it could be possible to envisage a dual pronged strategy in 
order to control interregional flows. A co-payment system 
could be established to disincentives individual mobility. This 
proposed system is born out of the idea that penalties should 
work as an incentive for the debtor regions, in order to push 
them to improve the quality of healthcare services and to 
establish excellence centers.
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